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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the public and the 
private sector interact in the labor market. Previous studies that analyze the labor market 
effects of public sector employment and wages have mostly assumed exogenous rules 
for public wage and public employment. We show that theories that equalize wages with 
marginal products in the private sector can rationalize the interaction of public and private 
sector wages when extended to accommodate a non-trivial government sector/public 
sector union that endogenously determines public employment and wages. Our model 
suggests a positive correlation between public and private sector wages. Any increase 
in tax revenues, coupled with the existence of a positive public-private sector wage gap, 
makes working in the public sector an attractive option. Thus, a positive neutral productivity 
shock increases public and private sector wages. More interestingly, even a private-sector 
specifi c productivity shock spills-over to the public sector, increasing public wages. These 
facts lend some support to the wage leading role of the private sector. Nevertheless, at the 
same time, a positive shock to public sector wages would lead to an increase in private 
sector wages, via the fl ow of workers from the private to the public sector.
Keywords: Public wages, public employment, labor market, trade unions.
JEL classifi cation: C32, J30, J51, J52, E62, E63, H50.
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Non-technical summary
The wage premium received by public sector employees relative to private sector employees has
been positive in most OECD countries over the past four decades, with some variation in the size
of the premium over time and some differences across countries. The standard theory by which
labor in the public and the private sector are paid at their marginal products would predict that
the ratio of wages in both sectors should be closely tied to the ratio of employees in the two sectors.
In fact, models with free labor mobility imply that wages should be equalized across sectors for
the same type of labor. In general a number of institutional, political and economic factors would
also contribute to the determination of public/private sector wages. The literature on public sector
labor markets reveals that the influence of public sector trade unions and the ”vote producing”
activities by civil servants are the potential reasons for the existence of the earnings differential.
Our paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the public and the private
sectors interact in the labor market. Contrary to the extant literature we allow for labor flows
between the private and the public sector to be endogenously determined in our model. We show
that theories that equalize wages with marginal products in the private sector can rationalize the
dynamic path of the public/private sector wage differential over the last four decades when extended
to accommodate a non-trivial government sector/public sector union that endogenously determines
public employment and wages. A key element of our model is that we consider an objective function
for the government that results from a bargaining process between the government and a public
sector union, leading to a public sector objective function that encompasses the maximization of
public wages and public employment. The inclusion of the union is crucial to rationalize the ob-
served existence of a wage premium. A standard model in which wages are equalized with marginal
products would not be able to predict a positive wage premium under standard assumptions. Nev-
ertheless a first message of our paper is that the literature has put an excessive weight on the role
of unions and institutional factors in order to understand public-private sector wage dynamics.
We are able to simulate experiments that help us understanding the dynamic behavior of aggre-
gate time series of public-private sector wages. In particular, we perform the following key exercises.
First, we study the impact of an increase in total factor productivity (a positive neutral technolog-
ical shock to the economy). This shock has a positive effect on output and on total employment,
with both private and public employment experiencing an increase. Private labor increases due to
the increased productivity, while given that the shock pushes up fiscal revenues the government is
able to increase public employment. The effect on public employment is larger than on private em-
ployment. However, the flow of employment from the private sector to the public sector generates
a larger effect on private wages than on public wages. Therefore, as a consequence of this shock,
the ratio public/private wages decreases and the ratio public/private employment increases.
Next, we study the effects of a (positive) shock to private labor productivity. This shock
generates an increase in the relative efficiency of private workers versus public workers, and displays
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0924
a positive effect on output and on total employment. As in the case of a neutral productivity
shock both private and public employment increase. Interestingly, although the shock is specific
to private employment, public employment increases in a larger proportion. As a consequence,
the ratio public/private employment increases. The shock generates an increase in fiscal revenues
which is transformed into more public workers in spite of the fact that the relative efficiency of
private workers is larger. Both private and public wages increase, but the ratio of public/private
wages decreases. The increase in private wages is clear, given the larger productivity. However,
in spite of the fact that the relative productivity in the public sector decreases, also public wages
increase. Therefore, the larger productivity in the private sector spills-over to the public sector,
increasing also public wages.
Finally, we study the effect of a relaxation of the budget constraint of the government, im-
plemented through an increase in taxes. As a consequence of this shock, both public wages and
employment increase. However, there is a reduction in private labor, an increase in private wages,
and also a decrease in total economy employment and total output. This shock increases both the
public-private sector wage premium and the ratio public/private employment.
Our results are consistent with the evidence on the pro-cyclicality of public sector wages, as
shown by the empirical results in the literature. In addition, and most importantly, the indicated
responses of wages to overall and a private sector specific technology shock would be consistent
with an observed positive correlation between public and private sector wages, while at the same
time being consistent with a wage-leading role of the private sector, if on average technology shocks
were the main drivers of business cycle fluctuations. At the same time, it also renders a rationale
to public wages leading private wages in certain episodes. These predictions are in line with some
recent empirical evidence on the causality of public and private wages. At the same time, our
results about the existence of crowding out effects of public employment on private employment
under quite general circumstances, are in line with the related, mostly empirical literature.
Our paper also has important implications for the recent debate on the effects of government
spending shocks. Indeed, being the public sector wage bill (public wages times public employment)
the main component of government consumption (some 60% for a representative OECD country),
the strong crowding out effects on private sector employment described in our paper would advise
against widespread use of public employment and wages policies as a device for short-term fiscal
stimuli. If implemented, the negative effects on private sector employment arising from the labor
market channel exploited in the paper might outweigh/counterbalance the positive direct demand
impact traditionally present in most macroeconomic models.
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1 Introduction
The wage premium received by public sector employees relative to private sector employees has been
positive in most OECD countries over the past four decades, with some variation in the size of the
premium over time and some differences across countries. The existence of such a positive premium
is a well documented empirical fact of developed economies, as shown in the surveys of Ehrenberg
and Schwarz (1986), Bender (1998), and Gregory and Borland (1999).1 The size of the public wage
premium has presented a degree of variation over time. As Figure 1 shows, the public/private sector
wage premium in the aggregate of the euro area countries showed a compression from a maximum
in the early 1970s to a minimum by the end of the 1980s, but then increased steadily again over the
last twenty years. In the US the (positive) wage premium has remained more or less stable since
the 1960s, while in the Nordic countries it has decreased steadily since the early 1970s, moving into
negative territory since the 1980s.
The standard theory by which labor in the public and the private sector are paid at their
marginal products would predict that the ratio of wages in both sectors should be closely tied
to the ratio of employees in the two sectors. In fact, models with free labor mobility imply that
wages should be equalized across sectors for the same type of labor. It is worth noticing that,
as witnessed in Figure 1, this behavior of the public/private wage premium has had a somewhat
parallel reflection in the dynamic evolution of the ratio of government sector employees to private
sector employees. The ratio of public to private employees in the euro area reached a maximum in
the second half of the 1980s, the same period in which the wage premium reached its minimum. A
similar though less marked pattern is apparent for Sweden2 while in the case of the US the link is
less clear by simple inspection.
In general, as signalled by the survey papers of Bender (1998, 2003), a number of institutional,
political and economic factors would also contribute to the determination of public/private sector
wages. While there is little research on the determinants of the public wage premium, the literature
on public sector labor markets reveals that the influence of public sector trade unions and the ”vote
producing” activities by civil servants are the potential reasons for the existence of the earnings
differential.
There are a number of papers that touch upon the issue of public/private sector wage deter-
1The main findings from this, mainly microeconometric, literature can be summarized as follows: (i) most articles
find a positive premium paid to central government workers, even after controlling for differences in the productive
characteristics of workers; (ii) in developing countries, however, the premium is usually negative; (ii) women and
minorities get higher wages in the public sector relative to their private sector counterparts. Following a related
literature, Bender (2003) signals that the largest difference in public/private wages can be found in the low-skilled
part of the distribution of earnings, while workers at the upper end earn less than their private sector counterparts.
Domeij and Ljungqvist (2006) show that this argument is at the heart of the compression of the skill premia in
Sweden as compared to the US. For the UK this argument does not seem to hold, though, as shown by Chatterji and
Mumford (2007).
2Pedersen et al. (1990) document this issue for Denmark.
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mination. Calmfors and Horn (1986) introduce public employment in a monopolistic union model,
and assume that the union chooses the same wage rate for workers in the public and private sectors.
Ardagna (2007), in a more general model assumes in the baseline specification that workers receive
a different salary in the public and private sectors, but at the same time assumes that there is no
mobility of workers among sectors, and thus closes the existence of potential job market flows.3
Algan et al. (2002), rely on the latter assumption to justify the difference of private and public
sectors’ wages.4 5 Recent papers using models with search mechanisms perform welfare analysis
under different exogenous rules for public wage and public employment wage setting (Quadrini and
Trigari, 2008, Gomes, 2009).
Our paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the public and the private
sectors interact in the labor market. Contrary to the extant literature we allow for labor flows
between the private and the public sector to be endogenously determined in our model. We show
that theories that equalize wages with marginal products in the private sector can rationalize the
dynamic path of the public/private sector wage differential over the last four decades when extended
to accommodate a non-trivial government sector/public sector union that endogenously determines
public employment and wages. We take this latter feature from the standing literature as reported
above. A key element of our model is that we consider an objective function for the government
that results from a bargaining process between the government and a public sector union, leading
to a public sector objective function that encompasses the maximization of public wages and public
employment.6 The inclusion of the union is crucial to rationalize the observed existence of a wage
3In an extension of the model she models the public sector labor market as the private sector one. Thus, she
allows monopoly unions to unilaterally set wages of public sector workers at the firm level.
4On related grounds see the dynamic general equilibrium models of Ardagna (2001), Cavallo (2005), Finn (1998),
Pappa (2004), Quadrini and Trigari (2007) and Forni et al. (2009), in which public employment is an exogenous
variable and wages in both sector are equalized according to the standard arbitrage conditions.
5Oswald et al. (1984) develop a model in which public sector wages are determined by efficient bargaining between
the government and a public sector union, assuming that the private sector labor market is perfectly competitive.
Forni and Giordano (2003), in a somewhat related framework, rationalize the wage premium mainly as linked to
the degree of coordination between unions in the economy (private and public sectors), along the lines of Holmlund
(1997) that considers the impact of cash limits in the public sector in a static framework in which differences in the
bargaining power of private and public sector unions might lead to a wage premium. Holmlund (1993) presents a
model in which the public sector wage premium arises because of externalities: the public-sector union ignores that
a wage increase will raise taxes for private-sector workers and reduce public consumption for all workers, including
those in the private sector. Demekas and Kontolemis (2000) use a static model in which government and private
sector employers compete for workers but make employment and wage decisions on the basis of different objective
functions, and in which a public sector wage premium arises if the (exogenous) probabilities of moving from one
sector to the other are higher in the public than in the private sector.
6As pointed out by Gregory and Borland (1999) trade unions are perhaps the most important part of the insti-
tutional environment in public sector labor markets. Simple union models predict that unionization will increase
employees’ wages at the expense of lower employment. Blanchflower (1991) shows that union density is larger in the
public sector than in the private sector in most of developed countries (see also Freeman, 1988, and Robinson, 1995).
Unionization also increases employment stability for public sector employees (Allen, 1988).
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premium. A standard model in which wages are equalized with marginal products would not be
able to predict a positive wage premium under standard assumptions. Nevertheless a first message
of our paper is that the literature has put an excessive weight on the role of unions and institutional
factors in order to understand public-private sector wage dynamics.
We consider a production function that relates output with three inputs: private labor, public
labor and the capital stock. Our choice of the production function implies that a positive level
of taxes is necessary to finance the public sector wage bill. In this framework we are able to
simulate experiments that help us understanding the dynamic behavior of aggregate time series
of public-private sector wages. In particular, we perform the following key exercises. First, we
study the impact of an increase in total factor productivity (a positive neutral technological shock
to the economy). This shock has a positive effect on output and on total employment, with
both private and public employment experiencing an increase. Private labor increases due to the
increased productivity, while given that the shock pushes up fiscal revenues the government is able to
increase public employment. The effect on public employment is larger than on private employment.
However, the flow of employment from the private sector to the public sector generates a larger
effect on private wages than on public wages. Therefore, as a consequence of this shock, the ratio
public/private wages decreases and the ratio public/private employment increases.
Next, we study the effects of a (positive) shock to private labor productivity. This shock
generates an increase in the relative efficiency of private workers versus public workers, and displays
a positive effect on output and on total employment. As in the case of a neutral productivity
shock both private and public employment increase. Interestingly, although the shock is specific
to private employment, public employment increases in a larger proportion. As a consequence,
the ratio public/private employment increases. The shock generates an increase in fiscal revenues
which is transformed into more public workers in spite of the fact that the relative efficiency of
private workers is larger. Both private and public wages increase, but the ratio of public/private
wages decreases. The increase in private wages is clear, given the larger productivity. However,
in spite of the fact that the relative productivity in the public sector decreases, also public wages
increase. Therefore, the larger productivity in the private sector spills-over to the public sector,
increasing also public wages.
Finally, we study the effect of a relaxation of the budget constraint of the government, im-
plemented through an increase in taxes. As a consequence of this shock, both public wages and
employment increase. However, there is a reduction in private labor, an increase in private wages,
and also a decrease in total economy employment and total output. This shock increases both the
public-private sector wage premium and the ratio public/private employment.
Our results are consistent with the evidence on the pro-cyclicality of public sector wages, as
shown by the empirical results of Lane (2003) and Lamo et al. (2007). In addition, and most
importantly, the indicated responses of wages to overall and a private sector specific technology
shock would be consistent with an observed positive correlation between public and private sector
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wages, while at the same time being consistent with a wage-leading role of the private sector, if
on average technology shocks were the main drivers of business cycle fluctuations. At the same
time, it also renders a rationale to public wages leading private wages in certain episodes. These
predictions are in line with some recent empirical evidence on the causality of public and private
wages (see Lamo et al., 2008, Lindquist and Vilhelmsson, 2007, and the references quoted therein).
At the same time, our results about the existence of crowding out effects of public employment
on private employment under quite general circumstances, are in line with the empirical results
of Malley and Moutos (1996) and Algan et al. (2002), Lamo et al. (2008), or Afonso and Gomes
(2008), and the theoretical results of Ardagna (2007).
Our paper also has important implications for the recent debate on the effects of government
spending shocks, as in Cogan et al. (2009), Romer and Bernstein (2009) or Taylor (2009). Indeed,
being the public sector wage bill (public wages times public employment) the main component of
government consumption (some 60% for a representative OECD country), the strong crowding out
effects on private sector employment described in our paper would advise against widespread use of
public employment and wages policies as a device for short-term fiscal stimuli. If implemented, the
negative effects on private sector employment arising from the labor market channel exploited in
the paper might outweigh/counterbalance the positive direct demand impact traditionally present
in most macroeconomic models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical evidence on the relationship
between public and private wages and employment. Sector 3 presents a standard general equilibrium
model that distinguishes two types of labor: private and public. Section 4 shows the calibration
exercise. Section 5 presents a quantitative analysis of shocks. Finally, Section 6 presents some
conclusions.
2 Relative public/private sector wages and employment
We will have a first look at the data through the lens of the assumption that workers in both
the public and the private sector are paid at their marginal products. Domeij and Ljungqvist
(2006) and Katz and Autor (1999) take a similar approach to analyze different, though related
problems. They break the work force into skilled (or high school equivalents) and unskilled (or
college equivalents) workers in order to study the skill wage premium. Following their approach we
consider a production function with a CES specification over labor inputs, which is nested inside a
Cobb-Douglas specification with capital,
Yt = AtKαt
[
μLηp,t + (1− μ)Lηg,t
] (1−α)
η (1)
where Lp,t and Lg,t denote private and public sector labor respectively, Kt is capital, Yt is aggregate
output and At is a measure of total-factor productivity. Time invariant production parameters
are α that pins down the private capital share of income, μ that measures the weight of public
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employment relative to private employment, and σ = 1/(1−η) that is a measure of the elasticity of
substitution between public and private labor inputs. The elasticity of substitution measures the
percentage change in factor proportions due to a change in relative factor prices. If σ = 0 there is
no substitution between the two factors, while if σ →∞ public and private employment would be
perfect substitutes.
Under the assumption that public and private sector workers are paid their marginal products,
the problem of the firm is to find optimal values for the utilization of labor and capital given the
presence of public inputs. Under the assumption that private and public workers are paid their
marginal products, we obtain that wages are given by:
W compp,t = μ(1− α)AtKαt
[
μLηp,t + (1− μ)Lηg,t
](1−α−η)/η
Lη−1p,t (2)
and
W compg,t = (1− μ)(1− α)AtKαt
[
μLηp,t + (1− μ)Lηg,t
](1−α−η)/η
Lη−1g,t (3)
So that the ratio of public/private sectors wages turns out to be:
W compg,t
W compp,t
=
1− μ
μ
Lη−1g,t
Lη−1p,t
(4)
Thus the public-private wage premium would depend on the relative employment level between
the two sectors and on the value of the parameters η and μ. As the relative employment level
of the private sector with respect to the public sector increases the public/private wage premium
increases via job market flows. Applying logs we obtain that:
log
(
W compg,t
W compp,t
)
= log
(
1− μ
μ
)
+ (η − 1) log
(
Lg,t
Lp,t
)
(5)
We estimate by OLS the above equation for a number of OECD countries.7 Table 1 shows the
estimated parameters. To account for the endogeneity of Lg,tLp,t in the regression, we instrument it
using one lag of the ratio and one lag of the independent variable (shown in the Table) and two
lags (not shown) and the results barely change. 8
Of special interest is the parameter σ, an estimate of the degree of substitution between public
and private sector employees. For all OECD countries the elasticity of substitution between public
7We estimate expression (5), extended with a time trend to account for the potential presence of technological
progress over time (following Domeij and Ljungqvist, 2006). We take data for the period 1970-2006, from the OECD
Economic Outlook Database.
8Standard tests of stationarity would tend to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity of both the ratio of wages
per employee and the ratio of employment for most countries. While from a theoretical point of view this is not
reasonable and would point to weaknesses of the empirical tests, it is also arguable that within the confines of the
actual sample used this is a possibility. In the latter case, the OLS estimates drawn from of the equation would be
superconsistent. To reinforce this point we provide standard unit root tests for the residuals of the regressions in the
Table.
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and private sector workers is greater than one with the only exception of Belgium. The numbers
in the table range from a minimum of 0.6 in Belgium to perfect substitution (σ →∞) in the cases
of Japan and Korea, and to a lesser extent the US. In fact, the elasticity of substitution for the
average of the euro area is estimated at 1.4-1.6 – for the euro area aggregate and the pool of euro
area countries – below the values of the Japan, the US, the UK (3.6), Sweden (3.8) and thus the
OECD pool (range 1.9-2.3). Within the euro area, countries with lower degree of substitution are
Italy (1.1), Netherlands (1.4), Belgium (0.6), Greece (1.1) and Portugal (1.0).
As shown by the information in Figure 2 for some selected countries, the fit of the estimated
model is quite good in the case of all European countries. For the US the model only captures the
average premium, even though the higher substitutability compared to EU countries might reflect
a more competitive labor market (less segmented between public and private sector employees).
In the case of Japan the apparent perfect substitution is related to the institutional setup of the
country. As indicated by Ishida and Matsushima (2009), in Japan civil servants are typically not
allowed to bargain collectively, and their wages are instead determined based on the advise of the
National Personnel Authority, with its particular emphasis on the equalization between the private
and public sectors. Although the advice formally covers only national employees, it typically sets
the baseline and hence has strong implications for salaries of local government employees. Along
the same lines, in the case of Korea perfect substitutability (σ →∞) stems from the institutional
features of the country by which wages are equalized by law between workers of the same type
working in different sectors (Song, 1999).
Overall, the results in Table 1 signal a high degree of substitutability between public and private
sector workers, but also some heterogeneity across countries. The assumptions that public workers,
on average, are paid their marginal products as private workers, and that there are job flows
across sectors, as prescribed by the standard theory, have to be taken into account to model the
interactions between public and private sector wages. Thus, we take the latter approach as a fair
starting point for our modeling strategy as described in the following Section. Nevertheless, given
that in this standard framework the existence of a (positive) wage premium is not possible, we
extend it to accommodate a non-trivial government sector/public sector union that endogenously
determines public employment and wages. This latter feature is also consistent with the standing
literature as summarized above.
3 A general equilibrium model
In this section, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model that includes explicitly the
public sector in the labor market. The model economy has three agents: households, firms and
the government. Households’ behavior is modeled in a standard fashion. Firms have access to a
technology that encompasses three inputs: capital, private labor and public labor. Thus, labor
supply is divided into private and public labor. The government raises taxes to finance the public
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sector wage bill, and decides over public employment and public employees’ wages.
3.1 Households
Consider a model economy where the decisions made by consumers are represented by a stand-in
consumer, with preferences given by the following instantaneous utility function:
U(Ct, NtH − Lt) = γ logCt + (1− γ) log(NtH − Lt) (6)
Private consumption is denoted by Ct. Leisure is NtH − Lt, where H is total time endowment
and it is calculated as the number of effective hours in the week times the number of weeks in a
year times population in the age of taking labor-leisure decisions, Nt, minus the aggregated number
of hours worked in a year, Lt. The parameter γ (0 < γ < 1) is the fraction of private consumption
on total private income. Households consume final goods and supply labor to the private and the
public sectors,
Lt = Lp,t + Lg,t (7)
where Lt is the aggregate level of employment, Lp,t is private employment and Lg,t is public em-
ployment. Public employment is chosen by the government and thus it is exogenously given to
the households. At an aggregate level, the households can only choose the supply of private labor,
Lp,t = Lt − Lg,t.
The budget constraint faced by the stand-in consumer is:
Ct + Kt+1 −Kt = (1− τt) [Wp,tLp,t + Wg,tLg,t + (Rt − δ)Kt +Πt] (8)
where Kt is the private capital stock, Wp,t is private compensation per employee, Wg,t is public
compensation per employee, Rt is the rental rate of capital, δ is the capital depreciation rate which
is modelled as tax deductible, τt is an income tax and Πt denotes profits from firms, to be defined
later. The budget constraint states that consumption and investment cannot exceed the sum of
labor and capital rental income net of taxes and profits.
Capital holdings evolve according to:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (9)
where It is household’s gross investment.
The problem faced by the stand-in consumer is to maximize the value of her lifetime utility
given by:
Max{Ct,Lt}∞t
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
γ logCt + (1− γ) log(NtH − Lp,t − Lg,t)
]
(10)
subject to the budget constraint, where K0 and the paths of public employment and taxes are
given, and where β ∈ (0, 1), is the consumer’s discount factor.
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The first order conditions for the consumer maximization problem are:
γ
1
Ct
− λt = 0, (11)
−(1− γ) 1
NtH − Lp,t − Lg,t
+ λt(1− τt)Wp,t = 0, (12)
βt [λt+1 (1 + (1− τt+1)(Rt+1 − δ))]− λtβt−1 = 0. (13)
Note that the above expressions imply that the consumer can only choose the supply of private
labor, given that public labor is determined inelastically by the government. This rests on the
assumption that there is a positive public-private wage premium.
3.2 Firms
The problem of the firm is to find optimal values for the utilization of labor and capital given
the presence of public inputs. The stand-in firm is represented by a nested CES with a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function. The production of the final output, Y , requires labor services,
L (both private and public) and capital, K. Goods and factor markets are assumed to be perfectly
competitive. The firm rents capital and hire labor in order to maximize period profits, taking public
inputs and factor prices as given. The technology exhibits constant returns to factors and thus,
profits would be zero in equilibrium. Nevertheless, public employment is paid by the government
via taxes, and thus there is a positive level of profits.
The technology is given by
Yt = AtKαt
[
μBηt L
η
p,t + (1− μ)Lηg,t
] (1−α)
η (14)
where Yt is aggregate output, At is a measure of total factor productivity, α is the private capital
share of output, μ measures the weight of public employment relative to private employment and
σ = 1/(1−η) is a measure of the elasticity of substitution between public and private labor inputs.
The parameter η indicates the elasticity of technical substitution between private and public labor.
Bt is the relative efficiency level of private labor.9
Under the assumption that private workers are paid their marginal products, we obtain that
wages are given by
Wp,t = μ(1− α)AtKαt
[
μBηt L
η
p,t + (1− μ)Lηg,t
](1−α−η)/η
Bηt L
η−1
p,t (15)
while the rental rate of capital is
Rt = αAtKα−1t
[
μBηt L
η
p,t + (1− μ)Lηg,t
](1−α)/η (16)
From the above equations, we obtain that private factors income is
Wp,tLp,t = (1− α)
μBηt L
η
p,t[
μBηt L
η
p,t + (1− μ)Lηg,t
]Yt (17)
9In some empirical specifications like the one discussed in a previous section the term capturing relative efficiency,
Bηt , is proxied by a linear trend in the expression for the public wage premium, i.e., B
η
t = e
t.
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and
RtKt = αYt (18)
The selected production function has three productive factors. However, the third factor, public
employment, has no market price. This implies that the rent generated by public labor is not
assigned to the private factors. As public labor is paid by the government, there is a positive level
of profits, that turns out to be
Πt = (1− α)
(1− μ)Lηg,t[
μBηt L
η
p,t + (1− μ)Lηg,t
]Yt (19)
The government usually does not charge a price that covers the full cost of the services provided
with the contribution of public labor. Therefore a rent is generated. We assume, without loss of
generality that profits are paid out to households given that they are the owners of the firm.
3.3 The government
Finally, we turn to the description of the public sector and its interactions with the private sector.
We consider a two-side role for the government: as a tax-levying entity and as a supplier of public
labor input. The government levies distortionary tax revenues to finance spending, pays the public
sector wage bill Wg,tLg,t and balances its budget period-by-period.
To provide an objective function to the government, we follow a standard text-book approach
(for example see Oswald et al., 1984 10) and pose an objective function for the government as
the solution of a game between a public sector union, that cares about the wage of public sector
employees, and a government that cares about the level of public employment given its budget
constraint. Thus, the government wants to maximize the following objective function subject to a
budget constraint:11
max
[
ωW θg,t + (1− ω)Lθg,t
]1/θ
(20)
where ω is the weight given to wages and θ is a negative parameter indicating the curvature of the
objective function of the government.12 If ω is close to zero, then the main goal of the government
is to maximize public employment (benevolent government preference), whereas if ω is close to
one, the main goal of the government is to maximize public wages (public sector union’s preferred
option). This function implies that the government wants to maximize both public wages and
employment.
10On related grounds Ardagna (2007) and Forni and Giordano (2003) consider the wage bill of the government,
employment and wages, separately as arguments of the objective function of the government or the public sector
union.
11This objective function for the government is similar to minimizing the following function: [ωWg,t + (1− ω)Lg,t]
in the case in which θ = −1.
12In order to ensure that a maximum is achieved, the parameter θ must be negative.
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The government obtains resources from the economy by taxing income from labor and capital,
where the effective average public wage bill tax is τt. The government budget constraint in each
period is given by,
τt [Wp,tLp,t + Wg,tLg,t + (Rt − δ)Kt +Πt] = Wg,tLg,t (21)
Thus, from this expression it is immediate to see that the public sector wage bill is constrained
to be
Wg,tLg,t =
τt
(1− τt) [Wp,tLp,t + (Rt − δ)Kt +Πt] (22)
Maximizing the government objective function subject to the government budget constraint we
obtain that public wages and employment are equal to:
Wg,t =
(
ω
1− ω
)−1/2θ [ τt
(1− τt)(Wp,tLp,t + (Rt − δ)Kt +Πt)
]1/2
(23)
Lg,t =
(
ω
1− ω
)1/2θ [ τt
(1− τt)(Wp,tLp,t + (Rt − δ)Kt +Πt)
]1/2
(24)
It is worth noticing that for a wage premium to exist, Wg,t must be larger than W
comp
g,t (the
competitive wage, as defined in equation 4).
This formulation implies that the wage-setting process in the private sector is totally different
to the one in the public sector. Whereas in the private sector wages are determined in terms of
their marginal products, in the public sector a given amount given by the budget constraint is
distributed between public wages and public employment. This distribution of the public resources
depends on government preferences. However, it is also true that both private and public sectors
are competing for the same labor input and as a consequence there is a relationship between public
sector and private sector wages.
3.4 Definition of equilibrium
Definition. A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of consumption, leisure,
and private investment {Ct, NtH − Lt, It}∞t=0 for households, a sequence of capital and labor
utilization for the firm {Kt, Lp,t}∞t=0, and a sequence of public employment and public wages
{Lg,t,Wg,t}∞t=0, such that, given a sequence of prices, {Wp,t, Rt}∞t=0 and taxes, {τt}∞t=0:
(i) The optimization problem of the consumer is satisfied.
(ii) Given prices for capital and private labor, and given a sequence for public labor, the first-
order conditions of the firm are satisfied with respect to capital and private labor.
(iii) Given a sequence of taxes, the government maximizes its utility function and the government
budget constraint is satisfied.
(iv) The feasibility constraint of the economy is satisfied.
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4 Data and calibration
We calibrate the model to replicate certain features of an economy of reference. For our exercise
we choose the euro area aggregate as our economy of reference given the importance of the public
sector in the labor market of the euro area. In calibrating the model presented in the previous sec-
tion we need information on the tax rate (τt), technological parameters, (α, δ, μ, η) and preference
parameters, (β, γ, θ, ω). Following Kydland and Prescott (1982) we set in advance as many param-
eters as possible based upon a priory information. Thus, before simulating the model, numerical
values must be assigned to the parameters of the model: (α, β, γ, δ, τ, μ, η, θ, ω).
4.1 Data
The data is taken from two different sources: the OECD Economic Outlook Database and the
EU-Klems Database. Output, wages and employment figures are taken from the OECD database.
The capital stock is taken from the EU-Klems database. The frequency of the data is annual.
We calibrate the model to the data of the euro-area for the last year in our sample (year 2006).
The public wage premium (W g/W p) is set to be 1.27, and the ratio of public/private employment
(Lg/Lp) to 0.20, where an upper bar denotes a steady state value. On the other hand, the ratio of
capital to output (K/Y ) is fixed to be 3.5.
4.2 Tax rate (τ)
In our model economy the government has to obtain fiscal revenues to finance public employment.
Our stylized model implies that all fiscal revenues are used to pay the public wage bill. Therefore,
we use an implicit tax rate that guarantees that the government budget constraint holds. Given
expression (21), the implicit tax rate in steady state is defined as
τ =
W gLg[
W pLp + W gLg + (R− δ)K +Π
] . (25)
The value of this particular tax rate has been calculated as the ratio of the public wage bill over
total output, and turns out to be 0.1428 for our calibration. This implies that, in order to finance
public employment, the income tax rate must be at least 14%.
4.3 Technological parameters (α, δ, μ, η)
In order to calibrate the technological parameters we use data from the euro area national income
and product accounts. First, the disposable effective time endowment of individuals, NtH (i.e.
non-sleeping hours of the working-age population) is taken to be 96 hours a week (H = 96). The
fraction of disposable effective hours that households spends working is equal to 0.25.
We take a standard value for the aggregate labor income share, (1− α), of 0.65. This implies
a value for α of 0.35. The capital stock and the depreciation rate are taken from the EU-Klems
database. The capital depreciation rate is set to be 0.06.
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Regarding parameters μ and η, we take the estimated values shown in Table 1. This would
imply that wages are determined by their marginal productivity in both, the public and the private
sector. Indeed, the fit shown in Figure 2 hint this assumption as a reasonable one, in particular in
the case of the euro area aggregate. For the euro area aggregate, the estimated value for μ is 0.698,
and the estimated value of η is 0.336.
4.4 Preference parameters (β, γ, θ, ω)
Finally, following the standard practice, (some) preference parameters are calibrated using actual
data. From the first order conditions we can obtain the following value of β and γ as a function of
data observations:
β =
1
1 + (1− τ)(αY /K − δ) (26)
γ =
C
(1− τ)W (N tH − L) + C
(27)
The resulting values are a β of 0.96, an a value for γ of 0.32. More complicated is the calibration
of the government preference parameters as we have no previous information about them. Given
this restriction, preference parameters for the government, (θ, ω) are obtained as follows. First, we
choose arbitrarily a value of θ equal to −1.13 This implies that the maximization of the objective
function for the government is equivalent to the minimization of a weighted average of public wages
and employment. Second, the value of the parameter ω is obtained calibrating the first order
conditions of the government maximization problem (expressions (20) and (21)). Therefore, given
our previous calculations about fiscal revenues and the data about wages and labor, we use the
model equations to obtain the resulting value for the weight given to wages in the government
objective function. The value of this parameter reflects how the government allocate its fiscal
revenues between public wages and public employment. The calculated value for the euro area
aggregate is 0.526, very close to one half, indicating that a similar weigh is given to wages and
employment in the government objective function. Table 2 summarizes the values of the calibrated
parameters.
5 Quantitative analysis of shocks
The calibration exercise conducted in the previous section enables us to conduct simulation exper-
iments with the log-linearized version of our model. In this section we present some simulations to
show the dynamics of the model via impulse-response functions. We consider two different shocks:
13A sensitivity analysis have been done for values of θ ranging from -0.5 to -2. For the analyzed range model results
remained almost unchanged. This can be explained by the fact that this parameter only affects the curvature of the
objective function of the government with little importance on the resulting equilibrium.
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a total factor productivity shock (neutral technological shock) and a private labor efficiency shock
(a specific shock to private labor). Additionally, we study the effects of an increase in the implicit
tax rate.
5.1 Total factor productivity shock
Our first exercise considers the case of an exogenous positive neutral shock to the economy, that is,
an increase in Total Factor Productivity, At. This is a standard shock in most real business cycle
models. We assume that TFP follows a first order autoregressive, AR(1), process:
lnAt = μ + ρA lnAt−1 + εAt (28)
where εAt ∼ N(0, σA). Selected values are ρA = 0.95 and σA = 0.01. We assume that the TFP
increases by 1% standard deviation on impact. As expected, this shock raises output on impact,
as more output is produced for given factor inputs. Hours worked also increase as the return to
work increases, rising output further. Additionally, due to the direct effect of the shock on output,
private labor productivity increases on impact. Capital stock also increases given the rise in its
productivity. Thus, overall, the effects of this shock in our theoretical framework are the same than
in a standard real business cycle model without the distinction between private and public sector
employment.
The inclusion of the distinction between private and public employment in our model, allows
us to move beyond the standard results, and to provide the separate effects on the private and the
public labor markets. The impact of an increase in TFP on the relevant variables is summarized
in Figure 3. We plot deviations in percentage points from steady state values. The shock has a
positive effect on output and on total employment, as expected, and described above. Both private
and public employment increase on impact but through different channels. Private labor increases,
as a consequence of the higher productivity. On the other hand, the shock increases fiscal revenues
and therefore, the government can increase the public wage bill and thus rises public employment
and public wages. The effect on public employment is larger than on private employment and as
time goes on, the effect on private employment turns even negative. Nevertheless, it is true that
this negative effect is relatively small. In summary, a TFP shock produces a ”crowding-out” effect
as there is a substitution of private employment by public employment.
As regards wages, there is an increase in private wages as a consequence of the gains in pro-
ductivity. Additionally, given the parameterization of the objective function of the government,
the increase in public revenues, leads to an increase in public wages. However, given the flow of
employees from the private sector to the public sector there is a larger effect on private wages than
on public wages.
Thus, our model prescribes additional insights on the effect of a TFP shock on total employment
as compared with the standard model. The crowding-out effect on private employment entail that
private wages do not only increases as a consequence of the rise in labor productivity after the
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shock, but also as a consequence of the transfer of labor from the private sector to the public
sector. Therefore, in this case the response of public employment puts pressure into both public
and private wages and thus reduces the effect of the shock on total economy employment. This
effect is missing in the standard model without a public labor sector.
Figure 4 plots the effects on the public/private wage premium and the ratio of public and
private employment in percentage deviations with respect to the calibrated one (year 2006 for the
euro-area). As a consequence of this shock, the ratio of public and private wages decreases. On the
other hand, the ratio public/private employment increases.
The important conclusion we obtain from our model is that a total factor productivity shock can
have a negative effect on private employment. The effect would depend, though, on the preferences
of the government regarding public employment. If the preferences of the government are such that
ω = 1, then public employment remains constant and the crowding-out mechanism does not hold.
In this case, all the change in public revenues is addressed to finance public wages, increasing the
public wage premium. However, the effect on private labor is the same as in a standard neoclassical
model. As the value of this parameter departs from one and approaches zero, the crowding-out
mechanism starts to work, moving employment from the private sector to the public one and putting
pressure on private wages. All in all, the results in this subsection imply that when accounting for
the effect of a TFP shock on total employment one must pay attention to the behavior of public
employment.
5.2 Private labor productivity shock
Next, we study the effects of a positive private labor productivity shock, i.e., an increase in Bt. This
perturbation can be interpreted as a rise in efficiency in the private labor sector of the economy
compared to the public labor sector. The analysis of this shock can be very interesting as one can
observe the effects a productivity shock in the private labor market has on the public labor market.
As in the case of the TFP shock, we also assume that private labor productivity follows a first
order autoregressive process:
lnBt = μ + ρB lnBt−1 + εBt (29)
where εBt ∼ N(0, σB). Selected values are the same as for the TFP process, i.e., ρB = 0.95 and
σB = 0.01.
We consider the case of a 1% standard deviation positive shock. In a standard model, the effects
of this shock would be qualitatively similar to the effects derived from an aggregate productivity
shock. However, in our context, this shock generates a rise in the relative efficiency of private
workers versus public workers affecting the overall behavior of aggregate variables.
At an aggregate level, this shock has a positive effect on output and on total employment as in
the case of an aggregate productivity shock (Figure 5). However, as total output increases it is also
true that government tax revenues will rise, which in turn will expand public wages and employment.
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Interestingly, although the shock is specific to private employment, public employment increases
in a larger proportion in the short-run, generating also a crowding-out effect. The explanation is
simple. Despite the fact that this productivity shock is specific to the private labor market, the rise
in public revenues gets translated into a higher level of public wages and employment. Again, there
is a movement of workers from the private sector to the public sector. As a consequence, the ratio
public/private employment increases (Figure 6). The shock generates an increase in fiscal revenues
which is transformed into more public workers in spite of the fact that the relative efficiency of
private workers is larger. This is an important feature of our model.
The effects on wages are as follows. Both private and public wages increase, but the ratio of
public/private wages decreases as the rise in private wages is larger than in public wages. The
increase in private wages is obvious, given the larger productivity provoked by the shock. How-
ever, in spite of the fact that the relative productivity in the public sector decreases, also public
wages increase. Thus, the larger productivity in the private sector translates to the public sector,
increasing also public wages.
This result supports the wage-leading role hypothesis of the private sector. Our model predicts
that a positive productivity shock in the private sector increases wages and employment in the
public labor sector. This is important to explain the dynamic relationship between wages in both
sectors.
5.3 Public sector wage bill shock
Finally, we study the effect of an increase in the available resources to the public sector via an
increase in taxes to finance the public sector wage bill. We consider the case of a 1 percentage
point increase in the tax rate.
The effects of this government decision on the economy are negative, as both output and total
employment decrease. The negative effect on output increases as time elapses given the convergence
to a lower steady-state value (Figure 7). The negative effect on total employment derives from the
effect on the private labor market. The increase in the public wage bill provokes a reduction in
private employment that come from two sources. First, the rise in the tax rate has a negative
effect on output, and then on private employment. Second, there is a flow of employment from
the private labor sector to the public one. Again, there is a crowding-out effect from the public
labor market to the private one. The increase of the public wage bill implies a rise in public wages
and a rise in public employment of about the same proportion, given the calibrated parameters of
the government utility function. Therefore, total employment decreases as a consequence of the
negative impact on output and on the movement of workers to the public labor market.
As a consequence of this shock, both public wages and public employment increase in the short-
run. However, as the adjustment takes place we observe a reduction in both public wages and
employment. The rise in the tax to finance public wage will provokes a reduction in total output
in the economy, and then, a reduction of government revenues, reducing the budget constraint of
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the government. In the private sector the adjustment implies a reduction in wages and a slight
recovery in employment. The total effect on private employment and total employment is negative
Figure 8 plots the percentage change in both the public/private employment and the pub-
lic/private wage premium. This shock increases both the public/private sector wage premium and
the ratio public/private employment. These effects are the outcome of, on the one hand, the overall
rise of public employment and the reduction on private employment and, on the other hand, the
larger increase in public wages compared to private wages. In the adjustment process we observe
that the public/private labor ratio decreases whereas the public/private wage ratio increases, as a
consequence of the reduction in public revenues.
6 Conclusions
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the public and the private sector
interact in the labor market. We show that theories that equalize wages with marginal products in
the private sector can rationalize the dynamic path of the public/private sector wage differential
over the last four decades when extended to accommodate a non-trivial government sector/public
sector union that endogenously determines public employment and wages. We take this latter
feature from the standing literature as reported above. The inclusion of the union is key to account
for the observed existence of a wage premium. Nevertheless a first message of our paper is that the
literature has put an excessive weight on the role of unions in order to understand public-private
sector wage dynamics.
In this framework we are also able to simulate experiments that help us understanding the
dynamic behavior of aggregate time series of public-private sector wages. Our model would pre-
scribes a positive correlation between public and private sector wages, while at the same time being
consistent with a wage-leading role of the private sector. These predictions are in line with some
recent empirical evidence.
Finally, we study the effects of several shocks. The behavior of the economy at an aggregate
level is qualitatively similar to the one generated by a standard dynamic general equilibrium model
with only one labor input. This is a proof of the robustness of our model. However, we can also
account for the effects on both the private and the public sectors, conducting a richer analysis
missing in standard models. The most important result derived from our analysis is the existence
of a crowding-out effect that causes that a positive productivity shock may have a negative effect
on private employment.
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Figure 1: The wage premium received by public sector employees with respect to private sector
employees, and ratio of public sector employees to private sector employees (%), selected OECD
countries.
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Figure 2: Relative public/private sector wages and employment: actual data (solid lines) and the
prescription of a model in which public and private sector workers were paid their marginal products
(dotted lines), selected OECD countries.
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Figure 3: Total factor productivity shock (1/2).
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Figure 4: Total factor productivity shock (2/2).
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Figure 5: Private sector employment productivity shock (1/2).
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Figure 6: Private sector employment productivity shock (2/2).
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Figure 7: Public sector wage bill shock (1/2).
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Figure 8: Public sector wage bill shock (2/2).
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Table 1: Job market flows and some determinants of the public/private wage premium. The
estimated equation is: log
(
Wg,t
Wp,t
)
= constant + linear trend + (η − 1) log
(
Lg,t
Lp,t
)
, where Lp,t and
Lg,t denote private and public sector labor respectively, and Wp,t and Wg,t private and public sector
wages per employee.
OLS estimation IV estimation
σ = η − 1 U-root σ = η − 1 U-root
− 1η−1 p-val − 1η−1 p-val
Euro area aggregate 1.4 -0.73 (0.03) 0.000 1.8 -0.56 (0.09) 0.000
Euro area pool (n = 443) 1.4 -0.70 (0.03) 0.000 1.4 -0.70 (0.03)
Euro area pool (weighted) 1.6 -0.62 (0.02) 0.000 1.6 -0.61 (0.02)
Germany 2.5 -0.41 (0.05) 0.004 2.4 -0.42 (0.05) 0.007
France 2.5 -0.39 (0.07) 0.007 2.5 -0.39 (0.07) 0.027
Italy 1.1 -0.93 (0.11) 0.032 1.1 -0.93 (0.11) 0.028
Spain 2.7 -0.37 (0.05) 0.004 2.7 -0.37 (0.06) 0.046
Netherlands 1.4 -0.71 (0.03) 0.017 1.4 -0.73 (0.03) 0.000
Austria 3.1 -0.32 (0.06) 0.000 3.1 -0.32 (0.06) 0.004
Belgium 0.6 -1.73 (0.12) 0.026 0.5 -1.98 (0.11) 0.004
Greece 1.1 -0.89 (0.08) 0.025 1.1 -0.89 (0.09) 0.008
Ireland 1.8 -0.57 (0.05) 0.004 1.9 -0.53 (0.05) 0.009
Portugal 1.0 -1.03 (0.08) 0.058 1.0 -0.99 (0.10) 0.001
Finland 2.2 -0.46 (0.06) 0.001 2.0 -0.49 (0.07) 0.001
Sweden 3.8 -0.26 (0.03) 0.000 4.0 -0.25 (0.03) 0.000
Denmark 1.8 -0.57 (0.04) 0.000 1.9 -0.53 (0.04) 0.001
Norway 2.9 -0.35 (0.03) 0.000 2.6 -0.38 (0.03) 0.000
United Kingdom 3.6 -0.28 (0.05) 0.001 4.7 -0.21 (0.05) 0.009
United States > 10 -0.09 (0.08) 0.005 > 10 -0.08 (0.08) 0.004
Japan  10 -0.00 (0.00) 0.002  10 -0.01 (0.10) 0.003
Korea  10 -0.00 (0.00) 0.000  10 0.00 (0.00) 0.000
OECD pool (n = 863) 1.9 -0.53 (0.01) 1.9 -0.53 (0.02)
OECD pool (weighted) 2.3 -0.44 (0.01) 2.3 -0.43 (0.01)
Notes: Pool estimates include fixed effects and country-specific linear trends. Weighted estimates account for cross-section
heteroskedasticity. The OECD pool includes all the countries listed in the table plus Island, Canada, and New Zealand. The
euro area pool includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Greece.
IV estimation: lagged log
Lg,t
Lp,t
and lagged log
Wg,t
Wp,t
used as instruments.
Unit root tests’ null hypothesis is H0: the residual of the regression has a unit root. Lag-length selection using the SIC criterion.
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Table 2: Calibrated parameters.
Parameter Value
α 0.350
β 0.960
γ 0.320
δ 0.060
τ 0.143
μ 0.698
η 0.336
θ -1.000
ω 0.526
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